Bourgeois, C., Fradj, N. B., & Jayet, P. - A. (2014). How cost-effective is a mixed policy targeting the management of three agricultural N-pollutants. Environmental Modelling & Assessment, 19(5), 389–405.
Abstract: This paper assesses the cost-effectiveness of a mixed policy in attempts to reduce the presence of three nitrogen pollutants: NO (3), N O-2, and NH (3). The policy under study combines a tax on nitrogen input and incentives promoting perennial crops assumed to require low input. We show that the mixed policy improves the cost-effectiveness of regulation with regard to nitrates, whereas no improvement occurs, except for a very low level of subsidy in some cases, for gas pollutants. A quantitative analysis provides an assessment of impacts in terms of land use, farmers’ income, and nitrogen losses throughout France and at river-basin scale.
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Jayet, P., & Petsakos, A. (2013). Evaluating the efficiency of a uniform N-input tax under different policy scenarios at different scales. Environmental Modelling & Assessment, 18(1), 57–72.
Abstract: Nitrate pollution from agriculture is an important environmental externality, caused by the excessive use of fertilizers. The internalization of this problem, via a tax on mineral nitrogen, could lead to a second best solution, reducing nitrate emissions. Several authors suggest that a reduction in agricultural support could produce similar results. In this paper, we examine the effects of different levels of a uniformly implemented nitrogen tax in France under two policy scenarios, corresponding to post Agenda 2000 and 2003 Luxembourg reforms of European Union ’ s Common Agricultural Policy, in order to reveal the synergies and conflicts between the tax and the policy scenarios in terms of nitrate emissions abatement. The analysis is performed at different geographical scales, from the national to the regional and is based on a bioeconomic approach that involves the coupling of the economic model AROPAj with the crop model STICS. Results show that the efficiency of the N-tax varies according to the geographical scale of the analysis and the type of farming. Furthermore, we prove that a uniform implementation may lead to perverse effects that should always be taken into account when introducing second-best instruments.
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